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1. Introduction 
 
In 2011, $298 billion was donated to charity and 64.3 million (26%) Americans volunteered 
for an organization.1 The literature has outlined several motivations behind the act of giving. 
Altruism posits that individuals may care about other’s well-being (Becker, 1974) while the 
warm glow motive states that individuals may get satisfaction from the act of giving (Andreoni, 
1989).  
 
In this paper, we explore the indirect reciprocity motive. Indirect reciprocity occurs when a 
beneficial act is repaid from someone other than the act’s recipient. This motivation has been 
previously studied in the context of family transfers as the demonstration effect motive where 
parents look after their elderly parents and in turn receive old age support from their children in 
the future (Arrondel and Masson, 2002; Cox and Stark, 2005; Mitrut and Wolff, 2009). Thus, 
people with children are expected to provide higher transfers to their elderly parents compared to 
people without children. 
 
We test for indirect reciprocity in charitable activities using data on charity donations and 
volunteer work from the Health and Retirement Study which is a representative dataset of the US 
population aged above 50. If people give because they expect to receive benefits from a third 
party, expectations about future benefits should affect one’s donations. We find that expecting to 
receive help from friends or relatives in the future increases both the probability and the amount 
of charitable activities performed.  
 
In Section 2, we present a simple theory adapted from Cox and Stark (2005) demonstration 
effect model and applied to charitable donations. In Section 3, we present our data, empirical 
strategy, and results. We conclude in Section 4. 
 
2. Theory and Testable Implication 
 
For simplicity, suppose that individuals live for two periods and that they value both periods 
equally. In the first period, individuals have income m and choose the amount of charitable 
donations x while in the second period, individuals get a return with exogenous probability π and 
get nothing with probability ሺ1 െ ߨ). Expected utility is given by 
 
ܧܷሺݔ, ߨሻ ൌ ݑሺ݉ െ ݔሻ ൅ ߨݑሺݔሻ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߨሻݑሺ0ሻ. 
 
Suppose that utility is increasing in net income ݑଵ ൐ 0. Charitable donations decrease the 
net income2 of individuals in period 1 but potentially increase net income in period 2. Individuals 
therefore choose the amount of charitable donations x that maximize their expected utility.  
 
The first order condition with respect to x gives us ܧ ଵܷ ൌ 0. Totally differentiating the first 
order condition and rearranging, we get  
                                                            
1 Sources: US Department of the Interior http://www.nps.gov/partnerships/fundraising_individuals_statistics.htm 
and Bureau of Labor Statistics http://www.bls.gov/news.release/volun.nr0.htm.  
2 Note that the model can also apply to time transfers where in this case x could be interpreted as the value of time 
measured in terms of wages, i.e., the opportunity cost of volunteering instead of working. 
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߲ݔ
߲ߨ
ൌ െ
ܧ ଵܷଶ
ܧ ଵܷଵ
. 
 
Differentiating expected utility with respect to x and then with respect to π, we get ܧ ଵܷଶ ൌ
ݑଵ ൐ 0. Moreover, sufficiency condition for maximization posits that ܧ ଵܷଵ ൏ 0. Thus, it must 
be that a higher probability of receiving a return (π) in period 2 leads to higher charitable 
donations (x) in period 1: డ௫
డగ
൐ 0.  
 
In the empirical section, we interpret the probability of receiving a return as the expectations 
of receiving help in the future. The testable implication of the model is that charitable activities 
should increase when one expects to receive help in the future. Moreover, it is a test of indirect 
reciprocity when the expected future help arises from parties other than the charities benefiting 
from the donations. This motive implies that when one expects to receive from others in the 
future, one would give more today. 
 
3. Empirical Analysis 
 
3.1. Data and Empirical Strategy 
 
We use data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) which is a biennial longitudinal 
dataset of older respondents. From 1996 onwards, we observe whether the respondent donated to 
charity and the amount donated in the HRS questionnaire: “In (last calendar year), did you … 
donate money, property, or possessions totaling $500 or more to religious or other charitable 
organizations?” and “About how much money did that amount to?” We also observe whether the 
respondent volunteered and the number of hours volunteered: “Have you spent any time in the 
past 12 months doing volunteer work for religious, educational, health-related or other charitable 
organizations?” and “Altogether, how many hours did you spend in the past 12 months doing 
volunteer work for such organizations?” 
 
Importantly, we observe expectations about receiving future help from friends or relatives 
should the need arise: “Suppose in the future, you needed help with basic personal care activities 
like eating or dressing. Do you have relatives or friends (besides your [husband/wife/partner]) 
who would be willing and able to help you over a long period of time?” We construct a dummy 
variable taking value 1 if the answer is “yes” and 0 if the answer is “no”.  
 
We use four waves of the data: 1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002, and limit our sample to the 
original HRS cohort of respondents born between 1931 and 1941 and to the War Babies Cohort 
born between 1942 and 1947. After dropping missing values (approximately 5% of the sample) 
this leaves us with an unbalanced panel of 35,090 observations. Summary statistics for our 
sample are reported in Table 1. 
 
Since our dependent variables are either discrete (whether gave to charity, whether 
volunteered) or censored (amount donated, number of hours volunteered), we use random effects 
probit and random effects tobit models respectively. Our key variable of interest is whether the 
respondent expects to receive help from friends or relatives in the future should the need arise. 
We also control for children, demographic characteristics, wealth, and religion. 
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Table 1 Summary Statistics 
 
Variable Mean s.d. Variable Mean s.d. 
Gave to charity  0.47 0.50 Female 0.57 0.50 
Amount donated ($1k) 5.62 19.09 Married 0.75 0.43 
Volunteered 0.36 0.48 Black 0.15 0.36 
Tens of hours volunteered 15.8 34.02 Good health 0.77 0.42 
Expect to receive future help 0.61 0.49 Years of schooling 12.4 3.12 
Has a child 0.95 0.22 Wealth ($100k) 4.37 11.1 
No. of children 3.64 2.45 Owns a house 0.82 0.39 
Average age of children  31.9 9.94 Christian 0.92 0.27 
Age 60.9 4.81 No. of observations  35,090  
Note: Amount of charity donated (in thousands) and number of hours volunteered (in tens) 
reported conditional on positive amounts in one year. All dollar amounts were converted to 2010 
dollars using the Bureau of Labor Statistics CPI calculator. 
 
3.2. Results 
 
Marginal effects from our random effects maximum likelihood estimation are reported in 
Table 2. As can be seen from the table, we find that expecting future help from friends or 
relatives increases both the probability and the amount of charitable activities performed. The 
probability of making a monetary donation increases by 3.2% and the amount donated increases 
by $312 conditional on donating. Similarly, the probability of volunteering increases by 5.5% 
while the number of hours volunteered increase by 9.2 hours All effects are statistically 
significant at the 1% level. 
 
Our results are consistent with the indirect reciprocity motive where respondents who expect 
to receive future help from friends or relatives perform higher charitable activities in terms of 
both time and money. We also note the additional interesting result that having a child increases 
the amount of charitable activities performed as well. This seems to be consistent with a 
demonstration effect motive which may arise due to one’s desire to demonstrate to children how 
to be generous towards others. Other interesting results are that women are more willing to 
donate time while wealthier people and Christians tend to perform higher charitable activities in 
terms of both time and money.  
 
One potential issue is that people who enjoy giving or who are altruistic may also expect 
others to have similar inclinations. We may therefore get a positive correlation between 
charitable activities and expectations of receiving future help due to the fact that generous people 
tend to give more to charity and also have higher expectations of receiving help from others 
should the need arise. To control for this potential bias, we take advantage of the panel feature of 
our dataset and estimate the model using fixed effects regressions. We therefore allow for a 
potential correlation between our expectations variable and the error term in our charitable 
8003
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activities equations. With fixed effects regressions, the fixed effect (generosity parameter) is 
differenced out. 3 
  
Results from our fixed effects OLS regressions  are reported in panel (b) of Table 3 and are 
qualitative similar to our reported results from random effects maximum likelihood estimation 
with some quantitative differences. Expectations of receiving future help increased both the 
probability of volunteering by 2.6% significant at the 1% level, and the number of hours 
volunteered by 7 hours significant at the 5% level. The probability of making a charity donation 
increased by 0.5% not statistically significant at the 10% level while amount of donations 
increased by $356 significant at the 10% level.  
 
Similarly, results from conditional logit models for our discrete outcomes in panel (c) of 
Table 3, suggest that expecting to receive future help increased the probability of volunteering by 
6.2% significant at the 1% level and the probability of giving to charity by 1.3% although the 
effect is not statistically significant at the 10% level. Those results suggest that controlling for 
fixed effects may be important especially in the case of monetary transfers. Nevertheless, our 
results are still consistent with the indirect reciprocity motive where respondents who expect to 
receive future help performed higher charitable activities, especially in terms of time transfers. 
One potential explanation could be that time transfers are more visible and individuals therefore 
are more willing to volunteer in order to demonstrate their indirect reciprocity.  
 
4. Conclusion 
 
The indirect reciprocity motive posits that people may give to charity because they expect to 
receive a benefit from a third party in the future. We proposed a new test of that motive by using 
Health and Retirement Study data on expectations of future help from friends or relatives. We 
find that respondents who expect to receive future help performed higher charitable activities, 
which is consistent with the indirect reciprocity motive.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
3 Among the four survey years in our sample period, approximately 27% of respondents changed their answer once 
to the question on whether they expect to receive help in the future should they need it. 19% changed their answer 
twice, and 3% changed it every year. This variation allows us to still test our hypothesis using fixed effects 
regressions. We also performed two tailed t-tests on the differences in means of observable characteristics between 
the group of respondents who never changed their answer and the group of respondents who changed their answer at 
least once. We found no statistically significant differences in the means of amount of charity donations, number of 
hours volunteered, marital status, gender, wealth, ethnicity, and religion across the two groups. We note that the 
group that changed their answers are slightly in worse health that the group that did not change their answers. There 
is a positive correlation of 0.05 significant at the 1% level between respondents whose health changed for the worse 
and who also did not expect to receive help anymore suggesting that respondents potentially updated their 
expectations after receiving an actual bad health shock. We controlled for health status in all of our regressions. 
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Table 2 Impact of Future Help Expectations on Charitable Activities 
 
 Charity Donations Volunteer Work 
      1 = yes 
     0 = no 
Thousands 
donated 
     1 = yes 
     0 = no 
Tens of       
hours 
Expect to receive future help 0.032** 0.312** 0.055** 0.915** 
 (0.010) (0.074) (0.009) (0.154) 
Has a child 0.157* 0.812** 0.180** 3.026** 
 (0.061) (0.396) (0.026) (0.773) 
No. of children -0.016** -0.083** -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.004) (0.023) (0.003) (0.046) 
Average age of children -0.002 -0.014 -0.007** -0.082** 
 (0.002) (0.011) (0.001) (0.023) 
Age 0.007** 0.036* 0.010** 0.148** 
 (0.003) (0.015) (0.002) (0.029) 
Female -0.002 -0.002 0.041** 0.404* 
 (0.018) (0.108) (0.012) (0.203) 
Married -0.637** -4.074** -0.639** -11.451** 
 (0.072) (0.888) (0.064) (2.220) 
Black 0.088** 0.508* 0.115** 1.990** 
 (0.030) (0.229) (0.032) (0.446) 
Good health 0.106** 0.942** 0.084** 1.626** 
 (0.015) (0.091) (0.009) (0.218) 
Years of schooling 0.077** 0.401** 0.043** 0.702** 
 (0.004) (0.023) (0.002) (0.057) 
Wealth ($100k) 0.008** 0.041** 0.001 0.021** 
 (0.002) (0.007) (0.001) (0.006) 
Owns a house 0.207** 1.436** 0.040** 0.432 
 (0.017) (0.127) (0.011) (0.280) 
Christian 0.191** 0.977** 0.119** 1.981** 
 (0.026) (0.135) (0.018) (0.277) 
Log likelihood    -16,738    -76,930    -17,552    -68,221 
No. of observations     35,090    
Note: Marginal effects reported from maximum likelihood estimation with random effects. 
Standard errors (in parentheses) block bootstrapped. All regressions include a full set of time and 
census division dummies and controls for spouse demographic characteristics. **significant at 1%, 
*significant at 5%, and †significant at 10%. 
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Table 3 Sensitivity Analysis: Impact of Future Help Expectations 
 
 Charity Donations Volunteer Work 
      1 = yes 
     0 = no 
Thousands 
donated 
     1 = yes 
     0 = no 
Tens of       
hours 
(a) OLS 0.019** 0.303* 0.039** 0.891** 
 (0.006) (0.142) (0.006) (0.237) 
     
(b) OLS with fixed effects 0.005 0.356† 0.026** 0.728* 
 (0.005) (0.198) (0.006) (0.285) 
     
(c) Conditional logit 0.013 - 0.062** - 
 (0.013) - (0.013) - 
Note: Marginal effects reported. Standard errors (in parentheses) clustered at respondent level. 
**significant at 1%, *significant at 5%, and †significant at 10%. 
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